The Defence and Offensive Intelligence Cycle

Note the article below. Canada and most other nations are trapped in a continious cycle of offence vs defence. Everytime we increase the security at an airport, the "bad guys" think up new wasys to defeat the technology we use to try and defend ourselves.

The answer lies in breaking the cycle we are in and outthinking the bad guys, instead of reacting to them.
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April 5, 2008

Profiling answer to airport woes: Expert

By LAURA CZEKAJ, SUN MEDIA

A security expert says Canadian airports should be turning to behavioural profiling to prevent terrorism, instead of just focusing on finding specific substances.
Thomas Quiggin says as Canadian airports continue to screen for materials identified as a possible explosives, such as liquids, terrorists are turning to other materials to circumvent security measures.

Powder is the next logical material they will try to use to trigger an explosion on an aircraft, he says.
Restrictions placed on bringing liquids and gels on planes implemented after the failed liquid bomb plot in the U.K. last year are reactive measures that fail to adequately protect the public, says the Canadian expert on jihadists, who also testified at the Air India inquiry.

Technology is often seen as the solution to terrorism problems. When knives and guns first posed a thr eat on planes, metal detectors were installed. Explosives are now screened for and liquids and gels are just the latest materials to be scrutinized.
The real threat, however, is not the objects themselves, but the people who intend to use them, says Quiggin.

ALREADY A FIXTURE

Behavioural profiling -- used in U.S. airports since 2003 and a fixture in Israeli airports -- needs to be widely deployed in Canadian airports as a preventive response to terrorism alongside existing screening methods, he says.
An advisory panel noted in its report released last year that while both Transport Canada and Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, which oversees security protocols in the nation's airports, "clearly do some forward-looking analysis, we did not find evidence of a systematic approach to anticipating possible future acts of aviation terrorism."

The report notes the value of screening technologies that combine human judgment with technology. It says behavioural analysis could be used to identify "higher risk" passengers for more thorough searches.

It's not about racial profiling, says Quiggin, it's about looking for someone who triggers alarms through their behaviour.

"It's much less intrusive than what is being done now, from a human rights perspective, or from a just plain harassment perspective," he said.
"In order to get in front of people who threaten security, it means going to a different form of behaviour, because right now we allow them to set the agenda and we try to react to it," he said.

Canada's Problem Child

A Book Review of Guantanamo's Child by Michelle Shepard

Canada’s Problem Child

Guantanamo’s child is about to become Canada’s child. The nearly six year old case against Omar Khadr is imploding in slow time as each new revelation exposes false information, accusations of torture and tampering. It is a legal process so appalling that the US Supreme Court, dominated by Republican appointees, declared the entire “military commissions” process unconstitutional in 2006. Whatever the outcome, it is becoming clearer by the day that Omar Khadr will be back in Canada in less than a year, and perhaps much sooner. How Canada deals with this problem is not clear.

The newly launched book by Michelle Sheppard, Guantanamo’s Child, gives the reader a direct insight into Omar Khadr and how he became the world’s most (in)famous child soldier. Contrary to the views of many in government agencies, the interest of Canadians is best served when national security matters are intelligently discussed in the public eye. It is ironic that in Canada, it is reporters such as Stewart Bell, Kim Bolan, Nazim Baksh, and Ian MacLeod who have the most knowledge and long term experience in critical matters such as terrorism and extremism. This work by Michelle Sheppard adds further to that body of knowledge.

The book reveals Omar Khadr’s life voyage as being extraordinary by any standard. From Toronto to the means streets of Jalalabad Afghanistan and to primitive mountain shelters in Waziristan, Omar Khadr travelled more in his first 15 years than most people do in a lifetime. Omar Khadr has also met a wide range of politicians and terrorists. He met Prime Minister Chretien, lived with Osama bin Laden and worked as a translator for Abu Laith al Libi , who would become an Al Qaeda spokesman.
The question arises. Is Omar Khadr a dedicated and dangerous jihadist who fought US Special Forces soldiers, or is he a 15 child whose disastrous life was laid out for him when he was born? One thing is clear. His father, Ahmed Said Khadr, wanted to build a puritanical Islamic inspired state in Afghanistan, and he was determined to shape his sons to be a part of that plan.

Jim Gould, a Canadian official working in an intelligence capacity, met with Omar Khadr in the prison at Guantanamo Bay. He describes Khadr by saying that “All those persons who have been in a position of authority over him have abused him and his trust for their own purposes.”

To truly understand Omar Khadr’s current situation, it is necessary to look into the murky world of terrorism, intelligence, high politics and law. In the story of Omar Khadr, all of these issues collide. The conflict between them is obvious, and no place more obvious in the lawyers who work on the varying sides of Omar’s case. The conflict among the lawyers, described in this book, serves to underline the real nature of the Military Commissions.

What is on trial here is the laundering of evidence gained by torture, the structures of the intelligence community, and the policies of the Bush Administration. The so-called “trial” will not have any rules that resemble an actual judicial proceeding. Much like the Soviet show trials of the 1930s and third world courts, confessions will be allowed, no matter how they were obtained. The presumption of innocence has been inverted to a presumption of guilt, and the rules of the Commissions are “flexible” to allow the presiding authorities to admit or exclude whatever evidence they want – including third party hearsay. However, some of the lawyers who have worked for Omar Khadr see the case as a legal one in which the forces of law need to be marshaled. In other words, they believe that they are engaged in a legal struggle. As the book makes clear, this is a political struggle, with the experience gained in past criminal trials of only modest value. To be a lawyer in this case is to fight in the “the wilderness of mirrors” that is world of intelligence and high politics. Ultimately, it appears as this case will be determined by those lawyers who can best understand and undermine the complex political and intelligence systems involved.

It is an unwitting Omar Khadr who has become a global symbol of all that is wrong with the so-called “war on terrorism.” The attacks on the World Trade Centres on September 11th 2001 killed almost 3,000 innocent victims. However, a series of incompetent policy decisions means that the USA has lost the moral high ground it could have controlled and exploited. As one of the Guantanamo staff put it, we have “lost the high ground, we cashed in our principles for a piece of information – and it did not work.”

Omar Khadr could have been a major victory in the ongoing struggle against extremism and terrorism. As a child soldier, captured at the age of 15, he would have been an excellent case for rehabilitation and return. As the son of a powerful Al Qaeda leader, this would have provided a significant anti-extremism message. Like his brother Abdurahman, there is no indication that Omar really wants to continue in the role of his father. Now, Omar Khadr and the entire Guantanamo Bay process have become a glowing symbol for further radicalization which is being exploited by Al Qaeda and its inspired followers around the world.

(Tom Quiggin is a court appointed expert on jihadist terrorism and assisted in the training of the defence lawyers who work for the Military Commissions

Detainee Transfers in Afghanistan

(written on 03 March 2008)

Afghanistan Detainees

This week, Amnesty International and the B.C. Civil Liberties Association will be attempting to have the Federal Court of Canada interfere with the UN and NATO sanctioned mission of Canadian personnel operating in Afghanistan. Specifically, they want to court to stop the transfer of Afghan detainees to Afghan authorities when they have been captured by Canadians.

It should be considered that it was the Canadian military that made the decision to stop transferring Afghan detainees until such time that the Afghan officials had made some basic steps to ensure fair treatment of the detainees. As a result, the system has improved and inspections have been made. Diplomatic and military officials have affirmed improvements to the system. The acting Canadian Ambassador has stated that a senior official from the National Directorate of Security has also been identified as being most responsible for the problems. He is now in jail. In other words, a series of allegations have been made, problems have been identified and fixes have been put in place.

It should be remembered that the whole point of the Afghan mission is to rebuild the state processes and get the Afghan state functioning. In this particular case, the rebuilding process appears to be actually working. Given that this is our goal, we should be supporting the decision process, not interfering with it.

Having Amnesty International and others making blanket statements about Afghanistan is not helpful in this situation either. While it might be true that abuses do occur elsewhere in Afghanistan, this is not relevant. What is relevant is the treatment of those individuals who are captured by Canada and their treatment by Afghan officials in the area where Canadians are located. The process for improvement is taking place where it should be – in Afghanistan. It should not be taking place in the Federal Court of Canada.

The Afghan Ambassador to Canada, Omar Samad, has stated he does not want this issue to overshadow other aspects of the mission. He is probably correct on a number of levels. The most basic human right is to be alive – to remain breathing. Next to that comes others basic rights such as food, shelter, clothing, and education etc. Amnesty International and the B.C. Civil Liberties Association are attempting to set up a complicated hierarchy of human rights to protect a wide range of insurgents, criminals and terrorists. In an abstract legal argument in a safe Canadian court room, this argument might make sense, even if it excludes discussing the rights of others. But in the real world of Afghanistan, the limited resources available must be balanced to try to protect the fundamental rights of the innocent as well. The mission cannot be paralyzed by a focus on one group over all the others. While some may feel that there should be justice “though the heavens may fall,” others feel that a balancing of rights and resources must occur in order for conditions to improve.

The legal grounds for this are doubtful at best. Justice McTavish of the Federal Court has tried to make an analogy to the “R. v Hape” decision. In the “R. v Hape” case, a Canadian citizen was being charged for money laundering in the Turks and Caicos Island. The question arose as to whether evidence offered for admission at his trial in Canada gathered abroad in accordance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Somehow, Justice McTavish has tried to make the analytic leap from evidence collection in a peacetime financial crime, to acts of terrorism and violence committed against non-combatants and Canadians in a conflict zone. Interestingly enough, the accused in the case of R. v Hape lost his appeal at the Supreme Court, which decided that the Charter did not apply to Canadians operating outside of Canada.
Canada may also not want to draw too much international attention to the issue of human rights as they relate to zones of conflict. Canada, because of its ineffective legal system, is the world’s premiere safe haven for those have committed acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. We also have a population of convicted and wanted terrorists as well as a vibrant organized crime community. In many countries, Canada has a growing reputation for offering shelter to want massive human rights abusers. One of the primary architects of the Rwandan genocide remains in Canada after some 14 years. Countries such as Croatia want the extradition of violent human rights abusers, but this does not happen. We still have a depressingly long list of ex-Nazis in Canada. And what of the Air India disaster? This was the largest international loss of life in a single act of aviation terrorism. It is also the largest mass murder in Canadian history. Ironically, many people in Canada criticized India’s heavy handed attack on Air India suspects while they were in India. Yet they seem to want to forget that it was Canada’s responsibility to prosecute these individuals. Canada failed dismally over a period of years, so others took action.

Canada holds the hammer in Afghanistan. The UN, the Afghan government and NATO all want Canadian troops and diplomats to remain in the mission. Canada can still stop the transfers again if there appears to be backsliding on the part of Afghan officials. Our role there is to support the Afghan government, not supplant it by the doubtful application of the Canadian Charter in the other countries.

The Show Trials Will Go On

Like the military commissions of the Second World War, the trials of Guantanamo Bay detainees have little to do with justice

Tom Quiggin


Ottawa Citizen Special

Saturday, March 01, 2008

Canadians should be seriously concerned about the Guantanamo Bay prison camp. One key reason is that "Gitmo" is one of the key factors that drives radicalization among aspiring jihadists here in Canada and around the world. Another reason is that inmate Omar Khadr may actually be innocent of the main charge of murder as a war crime. Additionally, the concept of trying a child soldier as a war criminal is a highly dubious process.

An increasing number of myths are being circulated about the Omar Khadr case. Among them are that the U.S. soldier who was killed on that fateful day was functioning as a medic. In fact, he was not.

The individual in question was a special forces soldier who was functioning as part of an assault mission. Like many other special forces soldiers, he had training as a medic.

We have been told about an "eye witness" account, but it appears that the eye witness was not actually in a position to see the events. And we were told that Omar Khadr was the only insurgent to survive the extended attack. But now it appears that at least one other survivor emerged.

Most interestingly of all, there is apparently no autopsy report that describes how the U.S. soldier died a few weeks after the battle, or what killed him. The information and evidence being produced in this case is even more suspect, given that the collection of it did not begin until about two weeks after the event occurred.

There is no legal or pragmatic reason for the military commissions to exist at this point. There is no war occurring that could affect the capabilities of the U.S. civilian courts and these civilian courts have repeatedly shown themselves capable of producing convictions in terrorism-related cases.

A fair and open court case serves not only the interests of justice, but would also serve to remove the jihadists' capability to use Guantanamo Bay as a radicalization tool.

The military commissions of the Second World War were implemented to hide the incompetence of the FBI and other agencies who had botched the case of German submarine-borne saboteurs. Eight German saboteurs were caught only because their leader turned himself in to American authorities and another member of the team deliberately left a trail of evidence behind him to ensure his capture. The military commissions, however, portrayed this dismal affair as a great success to assure the American people of the competence of their "homeland security" personnel. Déjà vu?

The Guantanamo Bay trials and the Soviet show trials of the 1930s have many factors in common as well. This is probably not an accident. In both cases, the objective of the trial is not to determine guilt or innocence, but rather to provide retributive justice.

At the same time, the trials are designed to justify and protect the illegal actions such as torture that led to the trials in the first place. It is not clear who in the U.S. is driving the trials, but it appears that Vice0President Dick Cheney and his staff are clear supporters. As well, the Department of Justice appears to be providing extensive support, which suggests officials there have reasons to push for convictions. Is this to somehow hide or justify their previous positions on torture and other abuses?

The Soviet show trials' chief prosecutor was Andrey Vyshinsky. His three main dubious ideas on justice were expressed in his book The Theory of Legal Evidence in Soviet Law. The first idea was that the "confession was the queen of all evidence" (no matter how it was obtained). His next idea was that the rules of justice were flexible depending on the needs of the authorities at the time. The presumption of innocence, he further argued, could only have a demobilizing effect in the fight against crime.

The rules of the current military commissions appear to be much the same. Confessions will be used, although it appears that no information about how the confessions were obtained will be entered. Nor will disclosure or discovery be used to determine how the confessions came about. Third-party hearsay evidence may also be allowed, depending on whether it is deemed to be reasonable by the judge.

According to Col. Morris Davis, who is a former chief prosecutor of the military commissions, it appears that the plan was made ahead of time to have no acquittals, no matter what the evidence was to reveal. General counsel William Haynes is quoted as saying (according to Col. Davis) "We can't have acquittals. If we've been holding these guys for so long, how can we explain letting them get off? ... We've got to have convictions."

Just like the military commissions of the Second World War, the current commissions are being run to put a veneer of respectability over incompetence, poor decision making and the complete loss of due process. How will the trials play themselves out? Unlike the Soviet show trials, there is still a functioning free press, so at least some aspects of the trials will be visible.

One thing is clear, the kind of experience that criminal defence lawyers have in normal cases will be of little value here.

The defence will, of course, attack the limited value of the evidence to be presented. But the key points of the trial will be in how the defence deals with intelligence process that has attempted to create the "evidence" being used, and how the defence attacks the intelligence structures that lie behind the processes. While this may sound similar to a normal criminal trial, the "wilderness of mirrors" that is the intelligence world bears no comparison to criminal procedures in a civilian court.

It is my view that the trials may produce a number of acquittals if they go ahead. This is especially true with respect to the minor opening cases such as that of Omar Khadr. He and others are the appetizers being served up before the main courses.

The intelligence community was never designed to produce evidence, and experience has shown that such capabilities are limited under even favourable circumstances. The legal process is the search for justice. Intelligence is the process to explain the known and estimate both the unknown and unknowable. One is about facts, the other is about probabilities.

Whatever the situation, it appears increasingly likely that Omar Khadr will return to Canada within a year. He may do so if the Guantanamo Bay facility is finally closed, if his trial results in an acquittal, or if he returns to serve out "short time" in a Canadian jail after a conviction on one of the minor charges. Dealing with his return should be under consideration now.

Tom Quiggin is a Canadian court appointed expert on jihadism and is currently assisting in the training of the defence lawyers for the Guantanamo Bay military commissions.


© The Ottawa Citizen 2008

The Hofstad Ruling

The Hofstad Decision – A Well Structured Ruling?

The recent Dutch appeals court ruling on the Hofstad group demonstrates clearly that the judicial system either lacks the tools or the understanding to deal with the current realities of transnational terrorism. The court has argued that the Hofstad group is not a terrorist organization because it had no lasting and structured cooperation and its members did not share a common ideology.

This is problematic in at least two areas and demonstrates a significant weakness in another. The current issue of dealing with terrorism is fundamentally different from past threats. Much of the preceding experience and understanding is no longer valid. Previously, many terrorist groups had a strong organizational structure which could be identified by intelligence or law enforcement agencies. Most past terrorist groups also had objectives that were relatively clear. As such, the enforcement and judicial processes involved in working against them was a difficult but clear-cut task.

Now, however, it is the nature of current terrorists groups is that they specifically do not have the structure and organization of the older groups. It is the very nature of self-radicalizing or “home grown” terrorist groups that they do not have a fixed structure and organization nor do they necessarily have a direct chain of command to any superior organization. As well, these self-forming groups exist only for a short period of time and frequently exist to carry out only one or two attacks.

The fact that contemporary terrorist lack a structure and organization poses significant new challenges for the security of the state. In the past, intelligence agencies were designed to confront other intelligence organizations or to collect information against other organizations that had hierarchical structures. Contemporary terrorist groups do not have these kinds of structures, therefore the state structures and laws may have to be redesigned to meet these new threats.

The court ruling also makes significant statements concerning religion and ideology. This is also a problem. It is precisely because of their lack of religious knowledge that many youth are vulnerable to radicalization and exploitation. Without a basic understanding of theology and morals, the young are susceptible to believing whatever they are told by radical recruiters, propaganda or Internet websites. Few jihadists have demonstrated any competency in Islamic theological or historical matters. Because they come from (generally) low practicing backgrounds, their knowledge on such affairs is limited. The majority of well-known jihadists have not come from madrassas, but rather have come from secular schools.

The narrative aspects of Al Qaeda’s ideology are largely religious, but the grievances (real and imagined) are largely political. Al Qaeda’s objectives are vague, but they are generally political in nature as they are aimed at overthrowing state leaders or replacing a number of states with a “caliphate.” In reality, most of Al Qaeda’s ideology is closer to utopian socialism than it is a theocratic assertion. There is no single, rigid all consuming ideology that makes up the beliefs of Al Qaeda and its inspired followers. Various followers may accept or reject various aspects of Al Qaeda’s beliefs or its operational methods, while maintaining their overall belief in a globalized jihadist organization. As such, the court’s focus on religious statements and the ideological discussions demonstrates that the context of the court’s ruling is questionable.

The ruling, if it stands, will also weaken further counter terrorism efforts and leave the Dutch state open to more upheavals caused by political extremism and terrorist violence. Counter terrorism in the 21st Century needs to be pro-active and pre-emptive in its nature. It would seem strange that the Dutch judicial community does not yet recognize this, given the reaction to the killing of Theo van Gogh. This one killing has polarized Dutch society, affected the balance of power in the Parliament, caused changes in the law and created yet another problem that challenges the social harmony of the Netherlands.

In short, the killing of van Gogh proves demonstrates the well know fact that terrorism is a political act and its goals are political. Mohamed Bouyeri’s murder of van Gogh has proved this.

The cost of terrorist attacks will increase in the future, both in financial and social terms. Terrorists having increasingly cost effective methods of attacks and smaller, less well structured groups can carry out these attacks. The homegrown terrorist group that carried out the London bombings on July 7th 2005 is a warning for the type of attacks that are probable in the future. Pre-emption and prevention are the key issues. In order to meet this challenge, the changing structure and organization of terrorists groups must be taken in consideration.





For more on this issue see:

http://www.ntu.edu.sg/RSIS/publications/Perspective/IDSS0782006.pdf

The Future of Intelligence is not in Technology

Technology and Future Intelligence

The future of intelligence is not about technology. It is about knowledge and how we manage, plan, train and organize ourselves to produce effective knowledge for leaders.

We have been promised a series of technological solutions to many of our intelligence problems since at least the 1960s. To date, technology has done a wonderful job of raw data collection and the collation (sorting and storing) of that data. This has been immensely useful in a number of areas such as satellite imagery, allowing leaders and decision makers to “see” where they would otherwise be blind. This type of technology was especially useful against a symmetric conflict where forces of a similar type faced each other. This technology, however, never did fill in one half of the two part intelligence question. While it did provide useful information on “capabilities” it did not provide the necessary information to produce knowledge on “intentions.”

Seen in another way, technology has provided intelligence services with large amount of data and information (the lower or left end of the continuum) but it has not provided any significant improvement with respect to knowledge and assessment (the higher or right end of the continuum).

It is critical in an asymmetric conflict to prevail with actionable intelligence (i.e. knowledge). Without it, the ability to prevail is severely compromised or lost. Given the nature of some of the threats (bio-terrorism or pandemics), the costs may not be sustainable by some states.

The challenge to intelligence agencies now has reversed in on itself. With a symmetric foe, the intelligence services could provide useful information on capabilities with high technology systems. Those same systems now are increasingly limited in their ability to detect capabilities and have little impact on determining intentions. As such, maintaining the current imbalance on spending in intelligence agencies (which favours technology over humans) will result in a net drain in resources where they are needed most.

Canadian Sanctuary

As noted in the Ottawa Citizen and others, it appears as though another international terrorist is living in Canada. This time, the individual who killed four and injured eleven in Paris in 1980 with a bomb has been living in Canada for several years.

Seeking Sanctuary

Canada has a long history of domiciling terrorism through what can be perceived as an unofficial policy of sanctuary and accommodation. Now it appears as Canada is once again home to yet another terrorist, this time the man who set off a bomb on Rue Copernic in Paris in 1980. The bomb killed four and wounded eleven others. His identity has become known now as a German intelligence service may have found a list of names of those in the organization responsible. It remains to be seen, but if history is an any example, it is unlikely that this individual will face rapid deportation – if at all.

Canada is by no means alone in having adopted an unofficial policy of allowing the presence of foreign terrorist operators and sympathizers on its soil. France and the UK previously allowed such sanctuaries to develop. Part of this understood policy was that terrorists would not carry out attacks in their host countries. Currently, only the United States may have more international terrorist groups on its soil than Canada.

Both France and the United Kingdom are instructive cases for Canada to examine. Prior to the 1980s, France had an unofficial policy of sanctuary. The general belief was that terrorism, especially international terrorism, was a foreign policy problem and a political issue. It was viewed as being a separate issue from criminality and law enforcement. It can be argued that the accommodation of foreign terrorist group on French soil worked reasonably well until the 1980s. The bombing on Copernic Street, most likely carried out by an individual now in Canada, was one of the early signals that this was changing. By the mid-1980s, French attitudes and policies changed. France now has one of the best and most effective counter terrorism policies in the world.

Like France, the United Kingdom also used to have an unofficial policy of terrorist accommodation. The issues became so bad in the 1990s that London became known as “Londinistan” to those who worked in the counter terrorism world. Ironically, while mosques and cultural centres in the UK were repeatedly being taken over by radical groups, it was local Muslims who tried to lead the fight against them. Unfortunately, they received little support from the UK government. However, senior officials in the UK began to take notice and make changes. On 17 June 2003, the head of the MI-5, Eliza Manningham-Buller, gave a public speech at the Royal United Services Institute that clearly outlined the threat of international terrorism to the UK. While many still doubted the threat, the deaths of 52 commuters and the injuries of 700 others in 2005 demonstrated the threat was real.

Canada, like the United States, has allowed numerous terrorist groups to flourish on its soil while putting only minimal effort into dissuading them. The Canadian government has provided funding to major international figures such as Ahmed Said Khadr (aka Abu al-Canadi). Funding by CIDA in one case was only stopped when the press exposed the operation. Canada also exercised its influence to get Mr. Khadr out of a foreign jail while he was being held for his role in attacking an embassy. Canada has also provided sanctuary to him and his family when they have been injured or eluding arrest overseas. Senior Canada politicians have also regularly attended fund raisers and other events for terrorist fronts that operate in Canada. The most egregious of these was then Finance Minister Martin at a fund raiser for the World Tamil Movement, but this was by no means the only case.

Even the shock of the mass killings of Air India did not move Canada. Perhaps even more amazing is the failure of the Canadian government to effectively pursue the terrorists who carried out this mass murder.

Canada now appears to have the same unofficial policy as France and the UK had in the past. Rather than upset foreign governments or draw attention to the problems in Canada, Canadian politicians have chosen accommodation rather than confrontation. The Canadian government has not toughened its laws or capabilities to drive terrorists and their front groups out of Canada. Groups like Hezbollah and the LTTE continue to do “fundraising” through various means, many of them criminal. Logistics continue to flow out of Canada to various terrorist groups while training is carried out on Canadian soil.

Unfortunately, the world is changing and so are terrorist groups. Canada has seen a host of “faint signals” which strongly indicate that we are not immune to attacks and have only narrowly missed several serious potential attacks. Like France and the UK before it, Canada needs to address this policy of sanctuary and accommodation to international terrorist groups.

Intelligence Analysis: Methodology is not Critical

Methodology is not Critical

Here is one of the more interesting aspects of intelligence analysis: methodology is not critical to the outcome of the analysis.

Every year or so, some other group or individual comes along espousing a new “methodology” that will solve all of our predictive needs. However, while many of them have some use, none of them have been able to prove capable of predicting the future in any meaningful way or providing repeated insights of value.

No analytic methodology exists or is likely to exist that will magically solve the problems of future prediction for the strategic intelligence analysis community. In the 1960s, Erich Jaentsch, who was an astrophysicist with strong interdisciplinary leanings, identified about one hundred different methods of rational forecasting. Since then, more methodologies have been added to the lists which are in use in varying environments.

A normative analysis of the situation would suggest that if there was a useful methodology for predicting the future, it would already be in widespread use. At the same time, if there was such a methodology, only a limited few forms of it would need to exist.

Given that there are over one hundred identified futures methodologies, it suggests that there has been little widespread success in this field to date. Methodology, however, is not a critical factor in the analytic process at any rate.

If there is a generous flow of information into an intelligence system which is then circulated to a wide range of open minded analysts, then the leaders will most probably get good analysis for their needs. Any basic methodology will make the process work. If on the other hand, information silos exist or the analysts are crippled by mindset problems, no methodology can defeat these overriding obstacles.

Among the various methodologies that have reached at least some degree of common usage are: Environmental Scanning, The Delphi Method, The Futures Wheel, Trend Impact Analysis, Cross-Impact Analysis, Structural Analysis, The Systems Perspectives, Decision Modeling, Statistical Modeling, Technology Sequence Analysis, Relevance Trees and Morphological Analysis, Scenarios, Interactive Scenarios, Participatory Methods, Simulation and Games, Genius Forecasting, Normative Forecasting, S&T Road Mapping, Field Anomaly Relaxation, Text Mining for Technology Foresight, Agent Modeling, State of the Future Index (SOFI), The Multiple Perspective Concept, Scenario Planning, and Causal Layered Analysis.

Are Terrorists Brainwashed or Mentally Ill?

Jihadists are not Brainwashed or Mentally Ill.

Much public discussion has occurred to suggest that those who support the global jihadist movement (and terrorists in general) have been brainwashed into supporting the various causes. These beliefs are rather widespread and have surfaced in a number of different countries.

There have also been a number of publicly held beliefs that the individuals who engage in this sort of activity are mentally ill.

Both of these beliefs should be discarded, simply because there is no evidence to support either suggestion.

Marc Sageman’s research on a large number (400) of jihadist terrorists makes it rather clear that mental disorders are not part of the overall problem. To the contrary, his work suggests that only four of the 400 may have had some sort of thought disorder and only one had a mild form of mental retardation. It was also clear that they did not normally suffer high levels of family trauma that may have caused disorders. Again, his research shows that less than 10% of his sample of 400 jihadist terrorists had a parent who died while they were young.

Sageman also notes that there was no evidence of “pathological narcissism” present. Sageman also points out that they were, overall, “good kids” and were usually overprotected as youths.

But if the individuals concerned are not mentally ill, is it possible that they were the victims of brainwashing? Sageman states categorically that brainwashing was not seen in any of his 400 cases, nor is there any evidence to suggest that brainwashing is a factor in terrorism in general. Sageman states that it is problematic to apply the concept of brainwashing to the global Salafi jihad and he states that:

“First, from a scientific perspective, five decades of research have failed to provide any empirical support for this thesis. Secondly, the biographical accounts of those explaining their embrace of the ideology fail to describe any coercive techniques leading to their final acceptance of the ideology. Third, like its ideological appeal counterpart, it is vulnerable to the fundamental problem of specificity. If so many people are exposed to the global Salafi jihad ideology, why do only a few succumb to it? Fourth, some incarcerated members now see the errors of their ways in pursuing violence in the name of God. If brainwashing is so powerful that only deprogrammers could restore victims, why can some do it on their own without apparent help, except for books supplied by their families? Fifth, no visitor to a Salafi mosque has ever reported the use of coercive techniques. Sixth, people who were a part of the “bunch of guys” groups also did not report coercive techniques. Finally, my arguments have explained the transformation of the potential candidates into dedicated global Salafi mujhhedin without recourse to this mysterious brainwashing process. There is no need for an additional and suspect concept to explain this transformation.”

Sageman’s findings, which are consistent with most of what is known about jihadists in general, is worrying. It is often convenient or perhaps comforting to dismiss homegrown jihadists as being simply crazy, brainwashed, or impressionable youths who have been misled.

Many of the homegrown jihadists, including suicide bomber Mohammed Sidique Khan and would be bomber Omar Khyam are quite sane and rational. This is by the standards of the community around them. They were not under the influence of any drugs, nor is there any evidence that they were subjected to some intensive form of coercion or brainwashing.

The undeniable, though unpalatable, truth, is that there is nothing “crazy” or “insane” about the homegrown jihadists. Rather, they are the product of the communities and the countries they were raised in.

More Marx than Muhammed

(This article was originally published in the Ottawa Citizen of 20 Sept 2007.)

Citizen Special

Thursday, September 20, 2007


The recent arrest in Quebec of alleged terrorist Said Namouh raises an interesting question. Is the wave of terrorist violence generated by political or religious motives? Jamal Namouh, his brother, states that Said Namouh did not appear to be religious while he was growing up. This may very well be true and it highlights a key issue.

Most jihadist terrorists lack even basic religious knowledge. What they do know about Islam is usually a few "cut and paste" lines spoon fed to them by radicals. Most "jihadists" were not raised religiously and have only come to their radical beliefs in their late teens or early twenties.

It is politics, not religion, that is at the core of the al-Qaeda movement.

The reality is that the debate about so-called Islamic extremism and jihad is taking place in the wrong forum. The roots of the ideology of al-Qaeda and its inspired followers are political, not theological. When you strip away the religious veneer from the writings of al-Qaeda's leaders, their message is one about oppression, domination and power. The main al-Qaeda doctrinaires champion their "vanguards," deny the possibility of compromise with the "oppressors" and state that a violent revolution must bring about a utopian state of affairs.

They believe revolution is the only answer and that only they can spur on the unenlightened masses.

Their writings have a distinctly Marxist-Leninist ideological overtone. Perhaps more interesting, nothing in the main messages of al-Qaeda would have been recognized by the Prophet Muhammad himself.

Where then, do the jihadists fit into the Muslim community?

It is probably fair to put Muslim believers on a continuum based on their degree of adherence to the faith. This would be the same with any religious group. On one end of the continuum would be the nominal believers. They may self-identify as Muslims, but they do not regularly attend mosque or adhere to the five main pillars of Islam.

Next on the continuum would be practising Muslims. They go to mosque regularly, attempt to follow the main teachings of Islam and attend most festivals. But Islam does not shape every aspect of their lives.

Next are the devout. They pray regularly, follow the five pillars of Islam and shape their lives according to the Koran and Hadith.

Finally comes the "orthodox" or the "fundamentalists." Many of these people want to turn back the clock to a time when the first generations of Muslims lived a purer existence. But this does not necessarily make them jihadists or terrorists.

What then of the radical jihadists or terrorists? Where do they fit into this continuum? The answer is that they do not. Evidence collected worldwide indicates that few jihadists are capable of carrying on a complex theological discussion. Taken to the basics, their debates are not that of theology, but rather a discussion of power and oppression.

If you cut out the Koranic quotes from jihadist writings, the radical views become ever clearer. And these views sound remarkably like other revolutionaries who have come before them.

The leading jihadists believe that they are part of small group of committed individuals who are going to be the vanguard of their own revolution. They will not enter into dialogue with their real or perceived oppressors and they constantly repeat that violence and revolution are the only answers.

Many of the jihadists also believe they are acting on the part of a larger oppressed but uneducated Muslim ummah or community. With their politicized violence and terrorism, the jihadis hope to spark a wave of unrest and revolution that will sweep their oppressors away.

Like many other revolutionaries before them, the jihadists are utopian revolutionaries. They have no real manifesto or plan for the future and no idea on how they will manage their new societies once they take power. Many jihadists blindly make the claim that Shariah law will solve all problems. However, the reality is that the Koran itself consists of some 6,200 verses, of which maybe 350 to 500 may constitute "Shariah Law," depending on which scholars you consult. Despite the claims of the jihadists, there is no "ready-made" Shariah solution to the problems of the world.

If it can be said that the jihadists have hijacked Islam for their own purposes, how should the Muslim community respond? As strange as it may sound, Muslim community leaders should start learning more about the ideology of al-Qaeda and how it is used to radicalize and recruit the young.

Extensive studies carried out in countries as diverse as Singapore, Canada and Saudi Arabia have confirmed that there are eight main themes that al-Qaeda-inspired ideologists have used to pervert classical Islamic teachings and radicalize vulnerable youth. Among those themes are jihad, bayat, hirja and takfir. Unless Muslims themselves grow to understand the twisted ideology that is undermining their community, it will be hard to stop this radicalization.

Yet very few people in the general public or the Muslim community would recognize key works, such as Knights Under the Prophet's Banner or Caravan of Martyrs. This is a major deficiency. This sort of literature, spread mainly on the Internet, constitutes a serious threat.

By understanding and confronting the jihadist claims, Muslim members of multi-racial, multi-religious western societies can contribute to a much-needed substantive discussion of where the future lies. The overriding aim of this debate must be to expose the global jihadist cause for what it is -- a group of violent "wannabe" revolutionaries who will use death and destruction to work toward their utopian but unobtainable goals.

The jihadists are much more Marx than they are Muhammad. Recognizing this truth will help strip them of their ill-deserved religious legitimacy. This will be a vital step in turning the tide in the global wave of radicalization.

Tom Quiggin is a court-appointed expert on jihadism and a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. E-mail: istquiggin@ntu.edu.sg

© The Ottawa Citizen 2007